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The Political Economy of Aid and
Governance in Cambodia
Sophal Ear
The impact of massive aid on development and governance has been studied for a decade
with mixed results. Using the results of an elite survey on aid and quality of governance
based on Kaufmann et al.’s six dimensions (voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption), this
article offers a case-study of Cambodia. The country’s challenges in light of high aid
dependence and ‘Dutch disease’ in the aid sector are elaborated, and disappointing
human development outcomes are examined. Despite more than five billion dollars in
aid, infant and child mortality and inequality have worsened. Key informants are
overwhelmingly in agreement that, save for political stability, aid has not had a positive
impact on governance in Cambodia. The failure on control of corruption shows how hard
it is for donors to be tough on a country with extreme poverty. On the basis of what has
been accomplished to date, however, aid seems unlikely to be able to deliver large
improvements in governance and in many ways may even contribute to its further
deterioration.
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Introduction
What are the consequences for governance in Cambodia of the massive amounts of
aid it has received since 1993? Post-conflict Cambodia had little choice on whether or
not to engage donors or, in a wider sense, about how to relate to the overall global
political economy. The country was a ‘pariah’ state for the duration of the 1980s in
the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge period and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia,
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and intensely sought to establish normal international relations and acceptance.
Following the Cold War, the Paris Peace Agreement signed on 23 October 1991
signalled the cessation of open warfare, though not the end of conflict itself for
Cambodia. Following the country’s two billion dollars UN-organised elections in
1993, Cambodia received five billion dollars in Official Development Assistance
(ODA),1 turning it into one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, with
half of its national budget funded from ODA. However, the lack of choice does not
mean the lack of consequences.
In 1996, Peter Boone of the London School of Economics raised the danger that
the provision of massive amounts of ODA might be counterproductive for
development. Subsequent to his study, there have been dozens of scholarly exchanges2
using cross-national data (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Easterly, 1997; Hansen and
Tarp, 1999) on the questions Boone’s assertion raises, including whether massive
amounts of ODA might have negative consequences for governance. Indeed, aid
dependence3 has been asserted to be empirically linked with the worsening quality of
governance (Knack, 2001). These analyses are contradictory in some respects and the
general conclusion is that the effects of ODA on governance vary from country to
country and need to be examined at the case-study level. This article offers a case-
study of Cambodia.
Using Kaufmann et al .’s (1999) six dimensions of governance (voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule
of law, and control of corruption), this article asks two questions: (1) what is the
relationship between the Kaufmann et al . (2006) scores and the very large amounts of
ODA Cambodia has received; and (2) can ODA be said to cause the rankings and/or
their changes?
To answer these questions, 43 key informants in Cambodia rated donor success
across Kaufmann et al .’s six dimensions of governance. These informants were
selected from various sectors, but all were involved in an intense way with ODA flows
and the performance of the Cambodian government. All of them had a minimum of
three years’ experience in Cambodia and their mean level of in-country experience
was eight years, with a median of seven years. These informants do not ‘represent’
even the population from which they were derived, but they do represent a very deep
set of experiences that can help explain the core dynamics of aid, development, and
governance in Cambodia.
The informants are heavily involved in Cambodian development (84% are employed
in donor agencies or non-governmental organisations) and have a great deal of
professional expertise (89% are managers or advisers). Collectively, they suggest that
the donor community affected change in the following dimensions of governance
(percent represents donor success rated as medium to very high): political stability
(67%); voice and accountability (47%); government effectiveness (30%); regulatory
quality (29%); rule of law (12%); and control of corruption (7%). These key
informants overwhelmingly agree that, except for political stability, foreign aid has
not had a positive impact on governance in Cambodia. Indeed, as will be discussed in
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greater detail for control of corruption, some informants were highly critical of the
donors. The failure on corruption shows how hard it is for donors to be tough on a
country that is genuinely aid-dependent for the survival of much of the population.4
In explaining governance outcomes, the importance of domestic political will and
political leadership cannot be overstated as key factors responsible for Cambodia’s
quality of governance. This is a subject explored in greater detail in Ear (2005: 17),
precisely ‘how well words have turned into action when it comes to governance in the
context of Cambodia’s economy’. It reviews a decade of achievements and failures of
governance in Cambodia, provides a framework through which to evaluate the likelihood
of success, and discusses trends in donor and government strategies*touching upon the
Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) ‘Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employ-
ment, Equity and Efficiency’ (RGC, 2004). It proposes instead a ‘Rectangular Reality’
in which political will is juxtaposed against policy environment and four quadrants
emerge distinguishing areas in which the RGC has political will (as evaluated by
outcomes, results, and practices) or lacks it, and has a policy or not. Political will for
exchange rate stability, inflation control, a market economy, and World Trade
Organisation membership exists, as do policies. However, support and policy for
anti-corruption that meets the standards of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption is absent, as is separation of powers*particularly of the Judiciary from
the Executive as required by the Constitution. Citing the absence of credible signs of
domestic leadership for reform, the World Bank abandoned its legal and judicial
reform activities in Cambodia in 2004. Lack of political will and poor leadership are
paramount factors responsible for the poor governance of Cambodia. However, this
article covers the role and performance of donors in effecting change in Cambodia’s
governance. Given the existing low level of political will and poor leadership, what is
possible at the margins and what has been achieved? Donors should and need to
become aware of their own impact on the governance outcomes observed in
Cambodia. As such, what impact on governance have donors had? What works, what
doesn’t, and*possibly*why?
This article is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, the next section
provides a literature review on how aid can influence development and governance.
The third section discusses the political economy context of the last decade for aid to
Cambodia and analyses the challenges faced in light of high aid dependence and
‘Dutch disease’ in the aid sector. The fourth section focuses on the Aid and Governance
Survey that was undertaken in AprilMay 2005. The fifth section examines the change
and continuity in donor roles with guidance from the survey findings. Donors have at
times pushed for voice and accountability publicly, while privately they have sought
political stability. The final section summarises the major findings of this article.
Literature Review on Aid, Development and Governance
Foreign aid has long been justified as essential for development under incomplete
market conditions in which investment is missing (hence the need for aid).5 Boone
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(1996) was the first to consider, empirically, a country’s political system in
determining aid effectiveness. In this sense, he was a pioneer in analysing governance
and aid.6 He found that aid does not significantly increase investment, nor benefit the
poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators, but it does
increase the size of government. According to Boone (1996: 322), ‘poverty is not
caused by capital shortage, and it is not optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary
policies when they receive aid flows’. The impact of aid does not vary according to
whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive. But liberal
political regimes and democracies, ceteris paribus , have on average 30% lower infant
mortality than the least free regimes.
His study is credited with having single-handedly motivated World Bank
economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar to perform their own analysis in an
attempt to rescue aid from (political) irrelevance.7 Burnside and Dollar (1997)
substituted Boone’s political system proxy with a quality of policy proxy and found
that money matters in a good policy environment. Under weak economic manage-
ment in developing countries there is no relationship between aid and change in
infant mortality, but in countries where economic management is stronger, there is a
favourable relationship.
Hansen and Tarp (1999) argued that the Burnside and Dollar findings were the
result of diminishing returns to aid. While analysing the same set of countries as
Burnside and Dollar and using the same basic model specification, Hansen and Tarp
conclude, in contrast to Burnside and Dollar, that aid does have a positive impact on
growth even in countries with a poor policy environment. They surveyed the results
of 29 papers published between 1968 and 1998, re-estimated the Burnside and Dollar
model, and conclude that ‘using past performance as an indicator of future
performance is especially dubious in this environment, given the existing limited
understanding of the interplay between aid, macroeconomic policy, and political
economy variables’ (1999: 1718).8 In a veiled reference to the World Bank’s 1998
study Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why, they write, ‘In sum, the
unresolved issue in assessing aid effectiveness is not whether aid works, but how and
whether we can make the different kinds of aid instruments at hand work better in
varying country circumstances’ (1999: 18).
Beyond questions of aid effectiveness, there emerged concerns of aid dependence
being linked with the worsening quality of governance. By 1999, Bra¨utigam and
Botchwey argued that the pre-existing quality of governance determined the extent to
which aid undermined institutions. Bra¨utigam (2000) followed up with a qualitative
study of aid dependence and governance.
Knack (2001), whose findings are re-examined in Ear (2006, 2007), offers a
significant literature review of how aid dependence can worsen governance defined
more specifically as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law.9 His own cross-
sectional analysis finds that a negative relationship exists between aid dependence and
quality of governance. According to Knack, aid dependence hurts quality of
governance by weakening institutional capacity, siphoning off scarce talent from
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the bureaucracy, weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption,
fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, and alleviating pressures to reform
inefficient policies and institutions.
Knack’s (2001) findings pose a serious problem for international development. For
example, while donors have been reticent to expose themselves to criticism, there was
a glimmer of introspection in the case of Cambodia. The World Bank’s 2004 annual
donor pledging session which it co-chairs with the RGC, known as the Consultative
Group Meeting, saw the Bank’s background document, Cambodia at the Crossroads ,
contain a chapter entitled ‘Improving Aid Effectiveness’. Although the chapter offers
no specifics, save for ‘numerous examples’, the World Bank (2004a: 108) admits that:
There is much that donors can and should do to make their assistance to Cambodia
more effective. There are numerous examples of how donors have behaved,
individually and collectively, which result in inefficient and ineffective aid; or which
even make things worse by contributing to (or exacerbating) a culture of
corruption and patronage in the use of public resources. Poorly managed aid can
inadvertently impede the evolution of a coherent Government vision of long-term
development; or undermine the capacity of institutions of the state and de-
legitimize civil society organizations.
But even if aid dependence hurts governance, as Knack found in his cross-national
study, which dimensions of governance, aside from bureaucratic quality, corruption,
and rule of law (dimensions he tested) are most affected and how? Beyond this, how
do we not throw out the baby with the bathwater? Even if for no other reason, the
drive to assess aid (and to pin the blame on poor governance) by International
Financial Institutions themselves is an act of self-preservation. Worldwide aid levels
have been on the decline since 1992, when they peaked. The World Bank was so
moved as to appeal directly to donor countries to essentially hang in there and
continue funding. Their Assessing Aid (1998) report found that the impact of aid on
growth and infant mortality depends on ‘sound economic management’, as measured
by an index of economic policies and institutional quality.10 Indeed, these policy
conclusions are obliquely mentioned without specific attribution in the same chapter
of Cambodia at the Crossroads . The report states, ‘There is an increasing body of
evidence that aid effectiveness depends heavily upon the existence of a sound
institutional and policy environment’ (World Bank, 2004a: 122).
Since Ear (2006, 2007) explores and criticises the empirical work of Stephen Knack
(2001) using the Kaufmann et al . data under pooled time series cross-section analysis,
this article focuses on Cambodia as a case-study of the relationship between aid and
governance. It follows Knack’s (2001: 326) advice that ‘a case-study approach should
examine more closely the recent experience of high-aid countries with deteriorating
institutional quality’. Cambodia, while not cited by Knack as a potential case-study, is
highly aid-dependent and has experienced deteriorating institutional quality as
detailed in the following sections.
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Cambodia’s Political Economy Context: War, Revolution, and Peace
Historical Background
Cambodia gained independence from France on 9 November 1953 and for most of its
modern history was led by His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk. Through the 1960s,
Sihanouk’s Sangkum Reastr Niyum or Popular Socialist Community movement
embarked on agricultural cooperatives, emphasising state-owned enterprises, and
launching numerous construction projects within the context of a market economy.
From a long-term perspective, the Cambodia conflict can be said to have started on
13 March 1970, when a coup d’etat against Sihanouk by his Prime Minister Lon Nol
and Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak (a cousin of Sihanouk) led to the birth of the
Khmer Republic. Cambodia abandoned its neutrality and sided fully with the United
States against North Vietnam.
On 17 April 1975, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge, a communist insurgent
movement, whose forces grew in strength when a deposed Sihanouk absorbed their
movement into his government in exile. Cambodia adopted an agrarian Maoist
economy where, over the course of less than four years, nearly two million people
died. The new government, led by Pol Pot with nominal heads of state Sihanouk (in
the first year) and Khieu Samphan, renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea.
Currency and private property were banned.
After a year of border skirmishes with Vietnam, the latter invaded Democratic
Kampuchea in December 1978, capturing Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979. Thus, the
darkest chapter in Cambodia’s history ended with a quarter of the population dead,
but a new one began in which the country lost its sovereignty. Until 1989, 140,000
Vietnamese troops were based in Cambodia. The parties to the conflict were the
Vietnamese proxy government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (the country
was renamed the State of Cambodia in 1989), the Khmer Rouge, then based on the
ThaiCambodian border, and a non-communist resistance composed of the royalist
Funcinpec11 and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front.
The period 19751989 took Cambodia to its nadir. The major impacts of the
conflict were overwhelming. Massive loss of human resources from death, disease,
and displacement (hundreds of thousands of Cambodians became refugees, many
resettling in third countries). Indeed, the United Nations (1992: 26) estimated that
most of the highly qualified Cambodians were living outside the country, among
them Cambodia’s best and brightest, systematically targeted by the Khmer Rouge as a
threat to regime. By 1993, the University of Phnom Penh which had been among the
best universities in Asia prior to the conflict had ‘almost no books, few professors and
only a handful of classrooms that were not shot to pieces as the Khmer Rouge raged
into Phnom Penh [on 17 April 1975]’ (Gibson, 1993).
On 23 October 1991, the parties signed in Paris the ‘Agreements on the
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict’*a peace treaty to
end the conflict and prepare the country for elections. The Agreements assigned to
the United Nations an unprecedented role*a two billion dollar mission known as
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the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) would supervise
the ceasefire, the end of foreign military assistance, and the withdrawal of foreign
forces. UNTAC would regroup, canton, and disarm all armed forces of the
Cambodian parties, and ensure a 70% level of demobilisation. UNTAC would
control and supervise the activities of the administrative structures, including the
police; ensure and respect of human rights; and organise and conduct free and fair
elections.12 Of course, these were lofty goals; the reality differed markedly.
Setting the Economic Context in the Late 1980s and 1990s
Two major economic factors were at play by the time UNTAC arrived. First, the loss
of aid from the former Soviet Bloc countries (the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance/Comecon in particular) severely affected public sector finances, and
caused macroeconomic imbalance*a budget deficit of nearly 4.6% of GDP in 1992
(World Bank, 1994). Aid dropped 35% from 1987 to 1988, while trade as a percentage
of GDP stagnated between 1989 and 1990. Second, immediately following this period,
Cambodia experienced extremely high inflation and exchange rate instability. Retail
price inflation exceeded 100% for much of the early 1990s.
In 1989, when the Vietnamese army began to leave Cambodia, aid doubled, and in
1991 it tripled. It was that year that the then United Nations Secretary-General Javier
Perez de Cuellar appealed to the international community to support Cambodia’s
rehabilitation efforts following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in October
1991. This resulted in pledges and other commitments totalling $880 million at the
first International Conference on the Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC) in Tokyo
in June 1992. New pledges of $119 million were added in September 1993 in Paris. In
1994, the total amount of aid committed to Cambodia at the second ICORC in Tokyo
again garnered over $800 million through 1996.13
Aid Dependence: ‘Dutch disease’ and Fungibility
From 1993 to 2003, five billion dollars of ODA averaging 13% of GDP annually was
given to Cambodia. Today, foreign aid accounts for half the national budget, and
while this aid is intended to help develop the country, its massive infusion has also
served to distort an economy with limited absorptive capacity. Not including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in Cambodia, of which there are
hundreds, the table below details the activities of 31 donors and suggests the massive
extent of their interventions relative to the RGC.
While aid was desperately needed for reconstruction, it became apparent by the
turn of the millennium that aid also has had unintended and undesired
consequences. Two specific problems are apparent:
The scale of aid is such that it distorts the economy. In an aid-related version of
‘Dutch disease’, a high proportion of Cambodia’s scarcest resource, educated
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people, is pulled toward employment in donor agencies and international non-
governmental organizations or attached to projects as salary-supplemented
counterparts. At the same time, donors and NGOs virtually take over the funding
of education, health care, social welfare, rural development etc., while government
spends most of its funds on defense and security. (Godfrey et al ., 2000: 123)
The ‘Dutch disease’ effect is particularly pernicious. Observed in the Netherlands in
the 1960s when large reserves of natural gas in the North Sea were first exploited, the
‘Dutch disease’ refers to the inflow of foreign exchange that de-industrialised the
Dutch economy. In the case of Cambodia, aid crowds out other sectors, becoming a
tradable sector financed by ‘revenues’ in the form of aid. Donor-financed workshops
and conferences abound; civil servants are often abroad on ‘study tours’ with their
salaries supplemented.
It should be said that civil servants’ salaries are barely above the poverty line of
circa 45 cents per day per person making moonlighting or gravitation towards the aid
sector almost a fait accompli . Yet civil service reform is not a high priority for the
RGC for political economy and patronage reasons, enabling the abuse of public office
for private gain. Salaries*still in the $2040 per month range*have increased, but
have not kept up with inflation. The Soviets used to joke, ‘They pretend to pay us and
we pretend to work’. The same can be said of civil servants in Cambodia. The second
problem described by Godfrey et al . (2000) in which aid allows government not to
spend on basic services, without using its moniker, is that of aid ‘fungibility’.14 By
2005, the analysis remained the same. A foreign expatriate manager with a dozen
years’ experience with a membership organisation of local and international NGOs
complained that ‘In some ways, donor projects have stifled government initiative,
placing foreign agencies largely in charge of the government’s service provision
responsibilities’. Another foreign expatriate with five years’ experience in interna-
tional and local NGOs added: ‘In some ways NGOs can’t avoid working with the
government. In some ways they should.’
Table 1 Selected Indicators of Aid Dependence in Cambodia
Indicator Year Value
Number of donors 2003 31
Number of donor-supported activities 2003 410
ODA as percentage of GNI 2002 12.7%
ODA as percentage of imports 2002 16.7%
Reported external assistance flows 19962001 $2,672m
. . . compared to total Treasury-executed expenditures 19962001 $2,122m




Area/rural development 2001 88.8%
Source : World Bank (2004a: 111).
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What the aid variant of the ‘Dutch disease’ implies for Cambodia is the functional
equivalent of brain drain into the aid sector from both the government and the
private sector*widely acknowledged as the engine of growth in any country. This is
what Knack (2001) calls the siphoning of scarce talent from the bureaucracy. State
capacity is weakened when the best and brightest are neither entrepreneurs nor
government policy wonks. Working for donors, they will naturally be donor-
driven*and while the goal of aid may be development*for bilateral aid it is more
often than not the donor country’s foreign policy and national interest that take
precedence.15 In Cambodia, aid spent by donors on 700 international consultants in
2002 was estimated to total between $50 and $70 million, approximately equal to the
wage bill for the country’s 160,000 civil servants (ActionAid, 2005: 22). Donor-
financed consultants working in the RGC are paid upwards of 200 times what their
Cambodian counterparts receive (ibid.).
Having established that aid may distort the Cambodian economy by siphoning
talent from government and the private sector, it is apparent that the country’s
tenuous balance between aid and governance needs to be rewritten. Clearly, there is
an urgent need to focus aid on improving governance. As both the Prime Minister
and the Finance Minister have said on separate occasions in 2001, the RGC is
‘conscious that good governance is a sine qua non condition for promoting social and
economic development and sustainable social equity’ (Hun, 2000; Keat, 2001).16
Deputy Prime Minister Sok An (2003) quipped, ‘There is no need to plead the case of
good governance. We are all converts.’17 Yet, if pleading the case of good governance is
to preach to the converted, actions (and political will) still speak louder than words.
What progress in development outcomes has been made to date?
Development Outcomes: Infant and Child Mortality, Poverty, and Inequality
A decade of Cambodian development has proven that technical solutions often fail in
the face of political reality. Notwithstanding large annual infusions of aid, what is
known of development in Cambodia is this: infant and child mortality, as reported by
the World Bank, have risen since 1990 despite real GDP growth of circa 7% per year
in the last decade. This and subsequent data are from the World Bank (2005b).
In 1990, 80 infants out of 1,000 died in their first year. By 2001, that number had
increased to nearly 97 in 1,000. While a jump over the course of a decade may be an
anomaly, what gives confidence in this trend is the continuous rise for the years in
between: 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2000. Moreover, child mortality (under five) also rose
steadily from 115 per 1,000 in 1990 to 120 in 1995, 135 in 2000, and finally 140 in 2001.
Together, infant and child mortality rates are the highest in the region, higher than
even Timor-Leste which in 2003 had an infant mortality of 87 in 1,000 and a child
mortality rate of 124 in 1,000 (the equivalent of 1995 Cambodia). Moreover, illness
can often be catastrophic, with high costs and low quality of care, leading families to
borrow at usurious interest rates or sell their only assets* livestock and land. Kenjiro’s
(2005) village-level research found that illness causes more land sales than crop failure.
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For example, while floods destroy crops, they also enable fishing which produces
income or provides protein. In contrast, ‘given the lack of health insurance and
insufficient governmental support to the health-care sector, Cambodians have to bear
all their own medical costs when they become sick’ and micro-credit, while available in
some areas, have high interest rates and are inflexible (Kenjiro, 2005: 780).
With respect to poverty reduction from 1994 to 2004, indications were that little to
no progress had been made through early 2005. This changed by late 2005 and early
2006 when World Bank (2006) announced a significant 12% decrease in poverty over
the last decade based on household consumption data collected in 2004. The World
Bank recalculated the national poverty rate in 1993/1994 from 39% (Prescott
and Pradhan, 1997; World Bank, 1999) to 47% using backward projection. Thus,
instead of announcing that poverty had decreased very modestly from 39% to 35% in
19932004, the Bank announced that poverty had decreased from 47% to 35%. In
1993/1994, only 56% of Cambodian villages and only 65% of rural areas were
accessible. The backward projection assumes that the remainder of the country,
largely controlled by the Khmer Rouge (by then known formally as the Democratic
Party of Kampuchea or DPK), was much poorer than its non-DPK counterpart.18
Moreover, sensitivity analysis reveals the lack of robustness in the World Bank
(2006) findings. If the 2004 national poverty line (1,826 Riels or $0.45 per person per
day) is increased by only 10%, or 183 Riels ($0.045), the national poverty rate jumps
to 41.6% from 35%. This 6.1% difference represents a 17.4% increase in poverty.
Caution should thus be exercised in interpreting the gains made in reducing poverty
in 19942004. More worrisome, inequality was found to have increased significantly.
In the non-DPK parts of Cambodia that were surveyed in 1993/1994, the Gini
coefficient for real per capita consumption was 0.35. This increased to 0.40 in 2004.
The Gini coefficient for all of Cambodia was 0.42 in 2004, making the country one of
the most unequal in the region.
Aid and Governance Elite Survey in Cambodia
On 24 April 2005 the author launched a confidential elite survey on aid and
governance in Cambodia. The online portion of the survey was open for informants
for a period of 10 days. While the total usable responses totalled 43,19 the survey
should be understood as representing only the views of those who responded.20 The
usefulness of this survey, in contrast to the Kaufmann data (on which the survey’s
dimensions and definitions are based), is to explore the relationship between aid and
governance among development experts. While the Kaufmann data places Cambodia
in the context of other countries in terms of governance performance, it says nothing
about the success of donors at changing the various dimensions of governance in
Cambodia. These informants were drawn from a potential group (targeted
individuals and large email distribution lists on Cambodia) which probably is no
larger than 200 from the number of individuals who received (or were forwarded)21
the message (a total of about 1,000) and met the criterion of three years’ professional
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experience working in development in Cambodia. The survey instrument probably
reached a significant number of individuals in the donor and NGO community, as
well as a few in the RGC who had the requisite credentials and internet access. The
response rate was about 21.5% of the relevant (informed) population of 200,
although the RGC respondents were under-represented. Informants listed themselves
as working for donor agencies (43%), international NGOs (25%), local NGOs (16%),
RGC22 (16%), many of whom were some combination thereof.23 Informants
averaged eight years of development experience in Cambodia, with a median of
seven years. Of these, 61% were foreign expatriates, 11% were Cambodian
expatriates, and 27% were citizens of Cambodia only.24 More informants classified
themselves as advisors (52%) than managers (37%), followed by educational or
research capacity (6%) and other (5%).25 Choices were not mutually exclusive
permitting informants to cross-list themselves.
Survey Background
The survey posited different impacts for aid in moderate to highly indebted, aid-
dependent countries such as Cambodia and offered three possible hypotheses:
(a) Some believe that the country’s dependence on aid makes it highly responsive to
donor demands and therefore prone to reform along international lines.
(b) Others believe that high indebtedness and a high poverty rate put great pressure
on donors to give even when the governance situation is disappointing. In effect
this gives the government freedom to ignore donor pressures and perpetuates
poor governance.
(c) Still other observers believe that the picture varies according to the dimension of
governance one examines, perhaps because of unevenness in donor priorities.
The literature has identified six dimensions of governance. These are defined in
Table 2.
How Cambodia Ranks across Kaufmann et al.’s Six Dimensions of Governance
Before delving into the survey results*how donors succeeded (or not) in effecting
change in the six dimensions of governance outlined above*examining how
Cambodia itself performed across these same dimensions of governance is useful.
The most recent release of the Kaufmann et al . governance indicators, Governance
Matters V, was launched on 15 September 2006, more than a year after the survey
conducted for this article closed in early May 2005 (and days before Govern-
ance Matters IV was released on 9 May 2005). As such, the rankings below could not
have been used by the respondents and could not have influenced them. Governance
Matters V provides percentile rankings for Cambodia in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002,
2003, 2004 and 2005 across all six dimensions of governance. Cambodia’s rankings
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for all dimensions of governance suggests a turbulent nine years. However, some
trends are evident (see Figure 1).
Cross-national rankings of the six dimensions of governance place Cambodia very
low, at the 31st percentile or below in 2005. The only two areas in which Cambodia
might be said to be moderately low (rather than very low) and improving are political
stability (31.1 percentile) and regulatory quality (27.2 percentile). The latter measure
is not confirmed by local informants, however, it picks up a decline in formal
regulation and its replacement by corruption (which is exceedingly high and
worsening), rather than a real improvement in the business atmosphere.
Political stability in Cambodia enjoys a markedly higher percentile ranking than it
did in 1996 (10.4 percentile), jumping to the 30th percentile beginning in 2000. This
was following Cambodia’s second national election which saw the return of Prince
Norodom Ranaridh to Cambodia after having been exiled following the 56 July
1997 events.26 Regulatory quality has seen constant performance in the low to mid
30th percentile for much of this past decade except for 2000 in which it actually
Table 2 World Bank’s Governance Indicators
Governance is defined as ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’
Process by which governments
are selected, monitored, and
replaced
Capacity of the government to
effectively formulate and
implement sound policies
Respect of citizens and the state
for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions
among them
1) Voice and accountability:







The quality of public service
provision, the quality of the
bureaucracy, the competence
of civil servants, the inde-
pendence of the civil service
from political
pressures, and the credibility
of the government’s com-
mitment to its policies
5) Rule of law: The incidence






2) Political stability: The
likelihood that the






4) Regulatory quality: The
incidence of market-un-
friendly policies such as price
controls or inadequate bank
supervision, as well as bur-
dens imposed by excessive
regulation in areas such as
foreign trade and
business development
6) Control of corruption:
Corruption, conventionally
defined as the exercise of
public power for private
gain. This ranges from the
frequency of ‘additional
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capture’
Source : Adapted from Kaufmann et al . (1999, 2006).
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reached 40.4 percentile*the year following the implementation of an International
Monetary Fund-endorsed value added tax and the resumption of aid that shored up
Cambodia’s finances considerably. In 2000, after the events of 56 July 1997 that led
to the suspension of aid from Germany and the United States in 1998 (United
Nations, 2000), Cambodia was ranked at the 18.4 percentile for political stability.
Likewise for regulatory quality*a dimension that was then in the 30th percentile
range. This is consistent with the Mostly Free rating the Heritage Foundation has
given the economy from 26.3 in 2000 to 16.8 in 2002 to 13.3 in 2004.27 Likewise, the
rule of law saw little by way of improvement. It languished in the mid 10th to low
20th percentile, turning in its worst performance in 2005 with a dismal 11.1 percentile.
Government effectiveness in contrast saw large fluctuations in rankings throughout
the nine-year period, but is now ranked below where it started in 1996, settling for
both 2005 and 2004 at the 18th percentile. This is likely tied to worsening control of
corruption and rule of law. Finally, voice and accountability has seen mixed
performance, peaking in 2000 at the 33.3 percentile, but otherwise remaining in
the low to mid 20th percentile for all the other years.
Survey Findings
The above results which show how Cambodia performed on six dimensions of
governance can now be compared and contrasted with donor success in these same
dimensions of governance. The survey results which asked for donor success in these
dimensions of governance show that aside from political stability and voice and
accountability, the informants felt that donors had in fact failed to effect change in
the government (with control of corruption being the absolute worst by far with only
7% rating donor success as medium to very high). The summary statistics for the
informants’ ratings concerning donor success across the six Kaufmann dimensions of
governance are shown in Table 3.
Political stability has the least ‘none’ to ‘poor’ ratings and the most ‘high’ to ‘very
high’ ratings, making it the best ranked dimension of governance in which donors are


















Figure 1 Percentile Rankings on Kaufmann et al .’s Six Dimensions of Governance 19962005.
Source : Kaufmann et al . (2006).
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accountability, although the informants qualified their rankings with a number of
comments suggesting that, for a country without a history of democratic governance,
Cambodia had come a long way. Rankings for all the informants are consistent when
examined under subgroups such as ‘Cambodian only’, ‘Cambodian expatriate’,
‘foreign expatriate’, or combinations thereof.28
Given that the 43 professionals working on development in Cambodia found that
the donors have been successful in ensuring political stability and to a lesser extent in
voice and accountability is an important outcome of the last decade of Cambodian
reconstruction and development. That government effectiveness and regulatory
quality have seen mixed success is troubling but not surprising given the lack of
human capital in the country and the need for state-building in the early post-conflict
period. Unfortunately, with the authorities’ lack of political will to curb corruption
and unwillingness to reign in impunity, the donors’ failure in effecting control of
corruption and rule of law was laid bare as shown in the results of the survey. Indeed,
as can be seen from the comments on ratings of ‘none’ and ‘poor’ for control of
corruption, some informants suggest that donors have enabled corruption to
Table 3 Informants’ Ratings on Donor Success
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The question asked: ‘For each of the above six dimensions of governance, please indicate whether you believe
that the donor community as a whole has succeeded in stimulating positive changes in Cambodia or if aid, in
effect, is given despite government refusal to change (for example, because of massive poverty or the country’s
tragic Khmer Rouge legacy). The score below should therefore reflect ‘‘donor success’’ at effecting change in the
government.’
Note: the top percentage indicates total informant ratio; the bottom number represents actual number of
informants selecting the rating.
Source : results of author’s survey.
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increase. A foreign expatriate manager and advisor with six years’ experience in
donor and local NGOs who has researched and taught in Cambodia concurred with
hypothesis (b) (namely, that high indebtedness and a high poverty rate put great
pressure on donors to give even when the governance situation is disappointing) and
argued that ‘Donors have no real incentive to curb corruption, because they are not
held accountable, nor are their activities very transparent. Donors are part of the
problem of corruption in Cambodia’, while another foreign expatriate manager and
advisor with a decade’s experience with donor, local and international NGOs who has
worked on research and advocacy added that donors ‘don’t control corruption in
their own practices’. Referring to corruption, a foreign expatriate manager with
11 years’ experience in an international NGO commented that donors ‘encourage it
and support it at every opportunity’.
A foreign expatriate manager with over three years’ experience with a donor agency
wanted to rate donor success in control of corruption as a negative 10 if possible.
Those who rated donor success as ‘poor’ did not mince their words either. A foreign
expatriate manager and advisor with seven years’ experience in an international NGO
and a Cambodian manager with four years’ experience with a donor agency agreed
on the absence of prosecution for corruption while a foreign expatriate manager with
a dozen years’ experience with a membership organisation of local and international
NGOs specifically stressed two recent incidents involving the World Food Programme
(WFP) (on Food-for-Work) and the World Bank (on demobilisation). Indeed, six
other informants named the World Bank as being unsuccessful in control of
corruption, despite four mentions of the World Bank being successful by others.29
Meanwhile, two other informants cited the WFP as being unsuccessful in controlling
corruption. Both cases are studied in greater detail in the fifth section. Given this
nuanced, multidimensional perspective of donor success towards effecting change in
governance, the roles donors have played in Cambodia more generally (and where
applicable specific dimensions can be addressed) during the last decade is the subject
of the next section.
Governance and Aid Effectiveness: Explaining the Results
Donors have played the role of doting parent and occasional disciplinarian to
Cambodia. The embarrassment of inaction during the Khmer Rouge genocide
has lowered their willingness to demand too much of Cambodia, making
allowances for the burden of its history. They frequently qualify Cambodia’s lack
of progress with its terrible past and the absence of human capital following the
Khmer Rouge period.30 Indeed, as has been argued by McCargo (2005: 107) ‘Given
Cambodia’s recent history of bloodthirsty ideological dictatorship and civil war,
the bar for what constitutes improvement is extremely low. Hun Sen and his
cohorts ‘‘get away with’’ authoritarianism because strongman rule is a lesser evil
than mass murder.’
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Defenders of the Faith: Voice and Accountability vs. Political Stability
Elections are the culmination of a democratic process. In Cambodia, elections seem
to be the process in the eyes of the international community. This is an important
lesson the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) learned after 1993 when it lost to the
Funcinpec Party. A brokered solution to the subsequent impasse called for no winners
and no losers in the form of two Prime Ministers from each party. As McCargo
(2005: 99100) has argued, ‘What happened under UNTAC in 1993 was the
beginning of a pattern in which Hun Sen used the outward show of electioneering to
legitimize the status quo rather than let power change hands’, adding that ‘Elections
in Hun Sen’s Cambodia have become an exercise in political theater that the CPP uses
to legitimize its power’. Indeed, the threshold for free and fair elections is not
particularly high, and varies according to observers. Observers may visit only for the
elections, unaware of the presence of an atmosphere of intimidation.
This may also help to explain why donor success in voice and accountability was
perceived by the informants as relatively good with 47% rating it as medium to very
high. In 1996, the leader of the European Union (EU) delegation, Italian Ambassador
Leopoldo Ferri de Lazara, said: ‘If Cambodia is able to maintain [the] present
political framework until the 1998 national elections, a democratic and normal life
will have been achieved after years of war and instability’ (quoted in REC, 1997).
With respect to human rights and democracy, the Ambassador said:
E.U. policy [is] to allow sovereign countries to reach democratic status by their own
means. This is a situation where the international community should help the
Cambodians rather than condemn them . . . Our approach on human rights is that
we feel if we continue our development aid we will see results. (Ibid.)
A retired diplomat (2003) described ‘crossing spades’ subsequently with the
Counsellor for the EU Delegation based in Bangkok: ‘he challenged my assertion
that Cambodia was not yet a democracy and dismissed the Cambodian opposition as
‘trouble makers’ for asking the [National Election Committee] to affect the
recounting of votes at some places during the 1998 election’.
This view was reconfirmed in 2003 by then United Nations Resident Coordinator
and Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme,
Dominique McAdams:
Based on the criteria used to assess a country’s degree of democratic participation,
Cambodia is a free and steadily progressing country. This assessment is based on
three main indicators: elections, a multiparty parliamentary system and free-
media . . . When it comes to political parties, very frankly, I don’t know any other
Asian country that would tolerate the level of strong words used by the MP Sam
Rainsy in his media papers or whatever . . . That the government may not have
performed as well on judiciary reform or the issue of corruption may be the result
of an over-ambitious reform agenda. (quoted in Doyle, 2003)
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With respect to political stability, the respondents judged donor success in this area of
governance as highest with 67% rating it medium to very high. Indeed, there was a
sense among the informants that a Faustian pact was made to promote stability at the
expense of democracy. Among the ratings for high to very high, the comments
attached were full of sarcasm like those of a foreign expatriate manager, advisor,
researcher and teacher with six years’ experience in donor and local NGOs who wrote
‘donor funds have helped prop up an increasingly autocratic, despotic state’ or a
foreign expatriate donor official with six years’ experience in Cambodia argued that
‘donors reinforce [the] status quo’ or a foreign expatriate manager, advisor, researcher, and
advocate with a decade’s experience with donor, local and international NGOs who
claimed that ‘the international community has and continues to happily underwrite
authoritarianism (which in the long run isn’t terribly stable, but donors don’t object to the
incremental expressions, such as the murder of Members of Parliament, etc.)’. A
foreign expatriate manager with 11 years’ experience in an international NGO added
that ‘donors have succeeded at making the current government ministers into some
of the richest, most secure officials of any ‘‘democracy’’ in the world’. Other
informants were truly genuine in their praise. A foreign expatriate advisor with six
years’ experience in a donor agency said, ‘Donor assistance to the election process has
resulted in three relatively successful national elections and the commune election.
Violence has decreased in each successive election and processes improved.’ Finally,
one particularly nuanced response from a foreign expatriate manager with a dozen
years’ experience with a membership organisation of local and international NGOs
was as follows:
Cambodia could not have extracted itself from its civil war without the help of
donors, in particular the UNTAC and the governments which supported it. It
should be remembered, however, that donors had previously fueled the civil war,
and much of the credit for an end to the fighting lies with the actions of the Hun
Sen government, and (then) Prince Sihanouk. Donors also contributed to a
resolution of the 1997 crisis by pressuring the Hun Sen-controlled government to
allow the return of Prince Ranariddh before the 1998 elections.
In late 2005, the arrests of human rights and civil rights activists were based on the
pretext of preventing chaos and instability following Cambodia’s signing of a
supplemental border treaty with Vietnam. After one of the activists was released, he
issued a statement that spoke to the perceived tension between stability and voice. He
argued that stability was used to justify the silencing of dissenting voices and that,
while he agreed that stability is important, ‘stability is not created by the short-term
stifling of dissenting views; in fact, such stifling has the opposite effect’ as ‘stability is
achieved by the long-term ability of a society to tolerate multiple voices and views,
and incorporate those differing perspectives into the ongoing development that all
democratic societies experience’ (Yeng, 2006). Four days later, on the occasion of the
dedication of the new United States Embassy in Phnom Penh and hours following
the release of four human rights activists from detention, its ambassador would quote
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Benjamin Franklin’s dictum: ‘Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety’.
Rule of Law: Capture of Justice Institutions
With respect to the rule of law (ROL) finding of the survey which is the second least
successful donor-supported dimension of governance with 12% rating it medium to
very high, Steve Golub (2003: 3) criticises the ‘Rule of Law Orthodoxy’ which he
identifies as ‘most prominently practiced by multilateral development banks’ and
defines it as a ‘‘‘topdown,’’ state-centered approach [that] concentrates on law reform and
government institutions, particularly judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal
systems that presumably spur poverty alleviation’. Using Cambodia as an example,
he explains:
A key assumption of ROL orthodoxy is that the judiciary is central to serving
society’s legal needs: Unless we fix the courts, many other legal reforms will fail. As
the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency puts it, ‘The rule of law is built on the
cornerstone of an efficient and effective judicial system’. . . . the Asian Development
Bank asserts that ‘although a daunting task, Cambodia has no alternative other
than to overhaul the current judicial system if it is to lay a strong foundation for the
nation’s future development. These claims tie in with related assumptions that
neither alternative roads to justice nor dysfunctional judiciaries are usable. This
package of assumptions, however, is fatally flawed. (Ibid.: 15)
In 2004, the World Bank stopped its traditional legal and judicial reform programme
in Cambodia because of an absence of political will and the likelihood that new
justice institutions would be captured by the authorities. A foreign expatriate
manager and advisor with six years’ experience in donor and local NGOs who has
researched and taught in Cambodia put it eloquently:
The state, including the army and the privileged elite are responsible for most of
the crimes, both violent (e.g. land-grabbing) and non-violent (e.g. corruption,
resource exploitation). Donor support has enhanced the state’s impunity. The
absolute inability of donor support to affect positive change in the justice system is
a case in point.
A singular exception to the donors’ failure in rule of law has been the Arbitration
Council, an independent tribunal established by law to decide on collective labour
disputes which cannot be settled by conciliation. The Arbitration Council was
established in 2003 according to the provisions of the 1997 Labour Law at the behest
of the United States which required Cambodian garment factories to meet
Cambodian labour standards (more than 60% of Cambodia’s export dollars are
garments that go to the United States). The Arbitration Council’s founders were given
the choice of being either independent without binding rulings or not independent
with binding rulings. They chose to be independent, believing that the Arbitration
Council’s legitimacy would grow over time and that participants would voluntarily
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choose that the rulings be binding. Without threatening the political elites’ hold on
power, the Arbitration Council has succeeded where others have failed. As a result,
the World Bank initiated a Justice for the Poor programme in 2005 to explore the
possibilities of alternative dispute resolutions in land conflicts.
Control of Corruption: Cambodia’s Problem and the Donors’
In tandem with the disappointing donor success in rule of law has been even worse
donor performance in effecting Cambodia’s control of corruption. Corruption
consumes a significant portion of the economy*possibly as much as the entire aid
budget each year. To combat it, Cambodia has been drafting an anti-corruption law
since 1994. However, this law has not been passed by the National Assembly and
while ‘Many use this as an explanation for the widespread corruption in Cambodia
and the culture of impunity that exists . . . a law is only the first stage of reform’
(MacLean, 2006: 9). The results of a survey on governance and corruption in 2000
prepared by the World Bank in response to a request by the authorities for technical
assistance for capacity building in enhancing governance and fighting corruption,
found that public corruption is perceived as a leading problem for citizens and
enterprises of all types with some functions of government, such as the judiciary,
revenue collection bodies, and bodies managing public assets rated particularly
poorly (World Bank, 2000: iv). A more recent survey of corruption shows that
unofficial payments31 amount to 5.2% of the surveyed firms’ gross revenue (World
Bank, 2004b), more than twice that of Bangladesh, Transparency International’s
bottom performer on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2004.32 Cambodia
was ranked for the first time in the 2005 CPI at 130 out of 158,33 and fell further in
the 2006 CPI to 151 out of 166 countries.34 Corruption has been estimated at
$120 million per year (World Bank, 2004b) and between $300500 million per year
by Calavan et al . (2004). This latter figure suggests that up to 12.5% of Cambodia’s
circa four billion dollar gross domestic product is possibly consumed by corruption.
A foreign expatriate manager and advisor with four years’ experience in donor and
international NGOs in Cambodia complained that the ‘Situation has deteriorated
from when I first worked in Cambodia in 1990’, while a Cambodian expatriate
manager with a decade’s experience in development quipped that ‘The anti-
corruption bill is a joke’ because ‘The whole government system, which is based
on patronage mentality, has prospered out of control due to corruption that has
benefited a select few. It would be too much to expect that the top would do anything
serious to cut their own throat and life line.’ A Cambodian expatriate manager with a
seven years’ experience in an international NGO and a National Institution called on
more ‘international pressure’ while a foreign expatriate manager and advisor with five
years’ experience with a donor agency went so far as to claim that donors ‘May have
made corruption worse’. Clearly, something has gone terribly wrong with the donors
and the RGC when it comes to corruption and the following two cases of donor
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handling of corruption in 20032005 are instructive: (1) the WFP and Food-for
Work and (2) the World Bank and Demobilisation.
Case-Study 1: The World Food Programme and Food-for-Work
In 2004, the WFP reported that more than two million dollars’ worth of rice had been
diverted from its Food-for-Work (FFW) scheme. The approach was at first very
public, with a front-page article in the Phnom Penh Post (Woodd, 2004b) and an
interview with the then WFP Representative in Cambodia (Woodd, 2004a). It
included prior consultation with Cambodia’s largest bilateral donor and assurances of
support by that donor as leverage on the RGC. At the time, the WFP Representative
put her foot down: ‘If [the government] did not accept anything then we would have
to seriously look at our future in Cambodia’ (quoted in McKenny, 2005). The RGC
quickly accepted the terms, took responsibility and agreed to repay in principle,
following its own investigation.
Unfortunately, the $2 million figure was then disavowed by the WFP which made
clear to the RGC that the amount in question was negotiable. A year to the day, on
28 February 2005, the RGC agreed to pay only $900,000.35 The WFP had suspended
FFW for the duration, but continued all other activities in order not to hurt the
‘hungry poor’ (quoted in Cochrane, 2005). The agreement came coincidentally after
the WFP announced that it would distribute 1,500 metric tons of rice to the drought
affected population. There was no apparent rallying around the WFP by other
donors, and no press releases were found either on the WFP’s global website36 or its
local one37 concerning this matter through mid-March 2005. The case was further
complicated by the WFP Representative’s coincidental and unrelated departure from
Cambodia for another posting and allegations of the WFP local staff ’s own
complicity in the corruption (evidence of which was used as a foil for criticism of
the RGC). While some local staff of the WFP did not have their contracts extended,
no government official was ever punished. One would hope that the lesson learned
from this will be the importance of credibility in issuing ultimatums, continuity,
and consistency in applying pressure and holding firm.
Case-Study 2: The World Bank and Demobilisation
In contrast, the case of the World Bank saw somewhat better results even though its
initial approach was more muted.38 The World Bank initially took a very low-key
approach for two years with respect to the declaration of mis-procurement in a
demobilisation project with the RGC. The Integrity Department of the World Bank
investigated certain procurement irregularities concerning a World Bank-financed
$6.9 million contract for the supply and maintenance of motorcycles. Mis-
procurement was declared on the contract on 26 June 2003 and the World Bank
sought repayment of $2.8 million. Seeing no progress, it was then reported in the
media that a letter was sent by the World Bank’s Vice President for East Asia and the
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Pacific which allegedly threatened that if the reimbursement did not take place by
15 February 2005, its entire portfolio of more than a dozen World Bank-funded
development projects would be suspended. This quickly produced results with the
immediate repayment of $2.8 million.
At an impromptu press conference on 21 January 2005, the Prime Minister
suggested to reporters that the World Bank had brought into the tender process the
private firms responsible for the corruption. Minister of Economy and Finance Keat
Chhon was more conciliatory when he was earlier interviewed by the Associated
Press. He said ‘It is regretful for me that such a problem has occurred. This was
because there were loopholes in the implementation . . . We must work to build good
governance, so others [will] stop suspecting that corruption was committed’ (quoted
in Associated Press, 2005).
Learning from the Cases
To be sure, the World Bank’s large size, its role as lender of last resort, and its stature
as co-chair of annual CG meetings gave it more leverage than the WFP, but the case also
suggests that the World Bank’s threat to suspend its entire portfolio was credible
while the WFP’s threat to examine its future in Cambodia lacked credibility.39
Learning from past lessons elsewhere, the World Bank already knew by 2004 that:
Experience in other countries in which donors have been criticized for past inaction
on corruption and poor governance suggests some basic internal changes that
donors can undertake*greater information disclosure, strengthened controls and
supervision, engagement of communities and civil society organizations in project
design and supervision as the norm, and better enforcement when abuses are
discovered. These measures can significantly reduce the opportunities for misuse of
ODA and, in doing so, contribute to clarifying the distinction between public and
private resources. (World Bank, 2004a: 122)
In the case of Cambodia, the World Bank failed to follow its own advice. It was
generally mute about its actions, disclosing little information in contrast to the
WFP. However, when it came to enforcement after the abuses were discovered, the
World Bank may have had the upper hand. After all, food is very different from
money, and the World Bank’s ability to penalise Cambodia through its annual
performance-based allocation exercise known as the Country Performance and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA), and more immediately by threatening to withhold
millions of other project funds, suggests that the authorities had little choice. In
refusing the Bank’s terms, they would be pennywise, pound foolish.
Indeed, as MacClean (2006: 10) points out, ‘A degree of political will for reform
exists within the government, but the reality is that those in power have little reason
to change a system that has secured them much power and personal wealth’.
Furthermore, ‘stricter costs imposed by the donor community would serve to
pressure the government and effect real change’. These stricter costs materialised in
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early 2005 when the CPIA scores became public for the first time since they were
introduced in the late 1970s*something the World Bank clients themselves had
lobbied hard against*making the instrument more credible as a deterrent against
poor governance performance. In February 2005, James Wolfensohn, then President
of the World Bank, declared, ‘We have reduced our lending to Cambodia*as a
response to the poor performance on governance indicators*but we have not
reduced our commitment, nor our efforts to push for the kinds of reforms that are
needed to bring about a better life for all Cambodians’ (quoted in World Bank,
2005a). His announcement was based on the 2004 CPIA score for Cambodia, which
had already been revealed to the authorities in a letter dated 26 July 2004. Finally, it is
worth noting that even in this ‘successful’ case, those who committed the corrupt acts
neither reimbursed their gains nor were prosecuted. It was the RCG that provided the
reimbursement and its budget is de facto donor-supported with fungible aid.
Conclusion
This article began with a brief review of the literature on how aid can influence
governance. Using Boone (1996) as a springboard, it focused on the issues raised by
Knack (2001), who found aid dependence to be associated with an increase in
corruption, worsening bureaucratic quality, and rule of law. This formed the basis for
this case-study on the political economy of aid and governance in Cambodia. The
country’s challenges in light of high aid dependence and the ‘Dutch disease’ in the aid
sector are elaborated and disappointing development outcomes are examined,
particularly in human development. Despite large aid infusions, infant and child
mortality and inequality have worsened.
Two questions were posed in this article: (1) what is the relationship between the
Kaufmann et al . (2006) scores and the large amounts of ODA Cambodia has received;
and (2) can ODA be said to cause the rankings and/or their changes? It would appear
that, aside from political stability and to a lesser extent voice and accountability,
Cambodia cannot be said to have enjoyed donor success in the other four dimensions
of governance. Political stability is the by-product of a peace dividend sowed by the
Cambodian stakeholders and nurtured by the international community. The donors
and the government were aligned on political stability, and this was clearly the
political bargain made in Paris in 1991, to move Cambodia from a state of war to one
of peace.
Certainly, with respect to control of corruption and rule of law, it would seem that
Cambodia may be further now from progress in these key areas than it was a decade
earlier. What is apparent too is that ODA has made it more feasible, at some level,
through fungibility, to divert resources and to increase corruption. The country’s
Kaufmann et al . (2006) ranking for 2005 in the area of regulatory quality
(27.2 percentile) is its second best followed by political stability (31.1 percentile)
and, according to the Heritage Foundation, it is better than most countries in terms
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of economic freedom. But this of course has masked a trade-off, one that has seen
regulations replaced with corruption.
Knack (2001: 326) suggested that ‘a larger fraction of aid could be tied or dedicated
to improvements in the quality of governance, for example, in the form of programs
to establish meritocratic bureaucracies and strong, independent court systems’. While
judicial independence remains a serious problem in Cambodia, and a meritocratic
bureaucracy cannot function in the context of $2040 per month salaries, donors like
the World Bank have already recognised that alternative justice mechanisms for
the poor are needed. On the basis of what has been accomplished to date, however,
ODA seems unlikely to be able to deliver large improvements in governance and in
some ways may even contribute to its further deterioration. Aid dependence generally
is not a positive condition for development.
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Notes
[1] This article uses ‘ODA’ and ‘aid’ interchangeably.
[2] ISI Web of Science tracked 63 separate references in refereed journals that cite Boone (1996).
[3] Aid dependence is a concept that, while broadly understood, has been defined in a variety of
ways. Lensink and White (1999: 13) define it as: ‘A country is aid dependent if it will not
achieve objective X in the absence of aid for the foreseeable future’. Riddell (1996: 24) has
called it ‘that process by which the continued provision of aid appears to be making no
significant contribution to the achievement of self-sustaining development’. Sobhan
(1996: 122) defines it as ‘a state of mind, where aid recipients lose their capacity to think
for themselves and thereby relinquish control’. Bra¨utigam (2000: 2), from whom the previous
definitions were gathered, envisages aid dependence as ‘a situation in which a country cannot
perform many of the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or
the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise’. In turn she
uses aid intensity as a proxy for aid dependence, aid as a percentage of GNP, central
government expenditure, current revenue, gross domestic investment, or imports.
[4] The failure on rule of law is of another category* it shows insufficient donor attention to
the issue and/or the application of dysfunctional models of institutional development.
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[5] For an excellent and current survey of the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid, see Harms
and Lutz (2004).
[6] Bra¨utigam (1992: 1) had already noted that ‘Much of the current donor discussion of
governance takes place outside of a historical or theoretical context’ and was a first attempt
to place governance ‘within recent political science, development management, and
institutional economics literature’.
[7] Harms and Lutz (2004: 16) note that when Burnside and Dollar (1997: 847) write ‘foreign
capital has not raised growth rates in the typical poor country’, they refer only to Peter
Boone’s 1996 European Economic Review article and the 1995 London School of Economics
working paper version from which the EER article is based, but not to any other studies.
[8] As Harms and Lutz (2004) have subsequently noted, however, many of the 29 papers
surveyed were ‘outdated’.
[9] Knack co-authored with Bra¨utigam a paper on aid and governance in sub-Saharan Africa,
finding that ‘high levels of aid are associated with declines in the quality of governance’
(Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004: 277).
[10] This was an outgrowth of Burnside and Dollar’s then working paper released in 1997 since
David Dollar was a director in the World Bank’s Research Department.
[11] Funcinpec is a French acronym for United National Front for an Independent, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia, a royalist political party formed by Sihanouk.
[12] UNTAC drew delegated authority from the Supreme National Council composed of all
parties to the conflict and chaired by Sihanouk.
[13] Indeed, a perusal of the titles of World Bank reports published in 19941997 tells the story of
transition: From Rehabilitation to Reconstruction (World Bank, 1994); Rehabilitation Program
(World Bank, 1995); From Recovery to Sustained Development (World Bank, 1996); and
Progress in Recovery and Reform (World Bank, 1997).
[14] According to World Bank (1998: 130), ‘fungibility’ is defined as the possibility for aid
recipient countries to reduce their own resources in the sector that receives aid and transfer
them to other sectors of the budget.
[15] According to Aristide (2000: 13), Brian Atwood, then Administrator of USAID, testified to
Congress ‘that 84 cents of every dollar of aid goes back into the US economy in goods and
services purchased. For every dollar the United States puts into the World Bank, an estimated
$2 actually goes into the US economy in goods and services’.
[16] The origin of the phrase ‘governance is a sine qua non’ can be traced at least as far back as
United Nations (1996).
[17] Sok An was at the time Senior Minister, Minister in charge of the Office of the Council of
Ministers, and Chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform.
[18] To compare apples to apples, the World Bank took the accessible part of the country in
1993/1994, ascribing to it the original 39% national poverty rate, and derived a 28% poverty
rate for the same area in 2004.
[19] Unusable responses included four that did not contain any answers and one that did not
meet the three-year criteria (the informant reported 1.5 years’ experience as a foreign
expatriate Advisor working for the RGC). One informant declined to rate donor success
numerically.
[20] More than 300 emails were sent asking recipients to respond, or to refer the author to
individuals they might know who met the three-year criteria. Responses online were
completely anonymous save for an optional question at the end of the survey requesting an
email address for follow-up.
[21] This is akin to a snowball sample.
[22] This includes references to RGC, ‘Parliament’, and ‘National Institution’.
[23] Informants indicated, for instance: National Institution, Parliament, university, and
international organisation.
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[24] Of those informants, a Cambodian specialist with nine years’ experience with a donor agency
replied via email sending ratings annotated with: ‘My life has . . . gone through several
regimes and governance styles, I feel frustrated or pessimistic about the current governance
system. I could not have much hope that the donors could play more [of a] role in this
matter for immediate impact, but it may be useful/helpful for building awareness and
confidence to our champion citizen or civil servants in a medium term or long term impact.
However, we also have to balance our thinking that given the fact that the foreign Aid/
assistance has a limited immediate impact on governance matter, and if we deny foreign
assistance, how much the poor citizen will suffer/benefit from the withdrawal of the donors
or international communities from our country? In conclusion, the government/political will
in making the reform in its governance system determine the achievement of the Aid
effectiveness for the quality of governance in Cambodia.’
[25] Informants described, among other professions, ‘political appointee’ and ‘donor official’, for
example.
[26] On 56 July 1997, then First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh was ousted from power by
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. This resulted in more than 70 extrajudicial killings of
mostly Funcinpec civilian loyalists. Although the precise details may never come to light, the
general storyline is that in the lead-up to the events, a power struggle between Funcinpec and
the CPP emerged in recruiting senior Khmer Rouge defectors. This led, for all intents
and purposes, to a coup d’etat. Forces loyal to the Second Prime Minister launched violent
and sustained attacks against forces loyal to the First Prime Minister (claiming that the
former was ready to take sole power) in Phnom Penh and the surrounding area (Amnesty
International, 1997).
[27] Heritage Foundation (2005) rates Cambodia as ‘Mostly Free’ in terms of economic freedom
with an overall score of 2.89 (ranked 63 just above Mexico), and the country ranks higher
than Thailand (71), Vietnam (137), and Laos (150) out of 161 countries.
[28] Whether there are differences in views among individuals who worked in management, as
advisors, in education/research or in some other capacity, is difficult to determine because so
many informants cross-listed themselves as functioning in one, two or more capacities. The
same is true across government, donors, and NGOs (whether local or international), where
quite a few informants had worked for more than one type of organisation over years.
[29] One pointed to the Social Fund, a Bank project that has now closed, and another referred to
International Financial Institutions in general (which includes the World Bank).
[30] According to Vachon (2005), Robert Hagemann, then Resident Representative for the IMF,
noted that it has only been since 1998 that Cambodia has been at peace, saying ‘It’s taken this
time to instill an amount of confidence [in peace] for people to begin planning ahead’.
[31] This is the preferred phraseology of the authorities, while it is more commonly known as a
bribe tax. Prior to being released, World Bank (2004b) saw all instances of ‘bribe tax’ replaced
with ‘unofficial payments’ at the behest of the RGC. However, the find-and-replace function
missed one instance in ‘Annex III: Methodology: Productivity and Investment Climate
Survey’ on page 110.
[32] Bangladesh was tied with Haiti in last place at 145 out of 145. Available at: http://www.
transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.en.html#cpi2004.
[33] The 2005 CPI rankings are available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2005.
[34] The 2006 CPI rankings are available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surve
ys_indices/cpi/2006.
[35] With less than half the initial amount claimed repaid, the penalty for corruption appears to
have gone on sale.
[36] Click on ‘Press Releases’ at http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country116.
[37] See http://www.un.org.kh/wfp.
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[38] Prior to 1996, when the ‘c-word’ (corruption) was seen as off-limits and political, the Bank’s
approach to corruption was ridiculed as the three-monkeys policy: see no evil, hear no evil,
speak no evil (see Bretton Woods Project, 2003).
[39] Richardson (2005) quotes a Bank staff member as having said in July 2002: ‘As long as
60 percent of the money gets where it’s supposed to go, that’s good enough for me’. On this
basis, she argues that such staff members should have been made to pay 40% of the $2.8
million.
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